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Use of CareManagement Practices in
Small- andMedium-Sized Physician
Groups: Do Public Reporting of Physician
Quality and Financial IncentivesMatter?
Jeffrey A. Alexander, Daniel Maeng, Lawrence P. Casalino, and
Diane Rittenhouse
Objective. To examine the effect of public reporting (PR) and financial incentives tied
to quality performance on the use of care management practices (CMPs) among small-
andmedium-sized physician groups.
Data. Survey data from The National Study of Small and Medium-sized Physician
Practices were used. Primary data collection was also conducted to assess community-
level PR activities. The final sample included 643 practices engaged in quality report-
ing; about half of these practices were subject to PR.
Study Design. We used a treatment effects model. The instrumental variables were
the community-level variables that capture the level of PR activity in each community
in which the practices operate.
Findings. (1) PR is associated with increased use of CMPs, but the estimate is not sta-
tistically significant; (2) financial incentives are associated with greater use of CMPs; (3)
practices’ awareness/sensitivity to quality reports is positively related to their use of
CMPs; and (4) combined PR and financial incentives jointly affect CMP use to a
greater degree than either of these factors alone.
Conclusion. Small- to medium-sized practices appear to respond to PR and financial
incentives by greater use of CMPs. Future research needs to investigate the appropriate
mix and type of incentive arrangements and quality reporting.
Key Words. Quality improvement, public reporting, physician groups, financial
incentives
The need to improve both the quality and the safety of health care in the Uni-
ted States is well documented. Reporting of quality data and pay for perfor-
mance for physicians have emerged as two of the most widely advocated
strategies for accelerating quality improvement (Rhoads, Konety, and Dudley





2009; Rodriguez et al. 2009; Gavagan et al. 2010; Hibbard, Stockard, and
Tusler 2003). Quality performance reporting is argued to improve physician
quality of care by appealing to physicians’ professional ethos and increasing
transparency of quality information to relevant peers or external stakehold-
ers (Marshall et al. 2000; Lindenauer et al. 2007). Pay for performance pro-
grams are intended to reward quality performance and reverse financial
incentives that can deter physician practices from investing in quality
improvement efforts (Beaulieu and Horrigan 2005; Cutler et al. 2007; Lin-
denauer et al. 2007; Young et al. 2007b; Glickman et al. 2009). However,
despite the intuitive appeal of quality reporting and pay for performance,
and the increasing body of evidence in the hospital sector, little is known
about the effects of such efforts in physician practices, as they affect efforts
to improve quality of care (i.e., Marshall et al. 2000; Peterson et al. 2006;
Rosenthal and Frank 2006; Greene and Nash 2009; Robinson et al. 2009a,
b). Although there is broad agreement that providing performance data and
feedback to physicians is likely to motivate improvements in care, there is
debate around whether such improvements are motivated at the margin by
physician performance data that are publicly reported, relative to data
reported privately to the physician group and its members (Wagner et al.
2001; Tsai et al. 2005; Werner and Asch 2005; Casalino et al. 2007). A sec-
ond point of contention are whether physician quality performance data
alone are sufficient to motivate changes in care processes, or alternatively, if
specific financial incentives must be linked to performance data to have an
effect on quality improvement efforts (Shaller et al. 2003; Rosenthal et al.
2004; Fisher 2006; Casalino et al. 2007; Young et al. 2007a).
Thus, two dimensions of quality reporting in physician practices warrant
further examination: (1) whether quality information is publicly reported or,
alternatively, reported only to the practice and the physicians working in that
practice and (2) whether reimbursement and/or financial incentives are tied to
the quality metrics reported. In principle, quality reporting may vary indepen-
dently on these two dimensions such that, for example, a practice may receive
reports publicly, but they may not be linked to reimbursement or incentive
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payments. Alternatively, quality reports may be promulgated only to
physician practices, and these reports may or may not be linked to financial
payment.
This study examines the question of whether physician practices subject
to quality reporting show marginal differences in the use of care management
practices (CMPs) if quality reports are made public and if financial incentives
are tied to quality performance. CMPs are defined as organized processes
implemented by physician groups to systematically improve the quality of
care for the patients they serve (Casalino et al. 2003; Shortell et al. 2009).
CMPs such as use of patient registries, electronic medical records, physician
performance feedback, provider education, and reminders have been associ-
ated with significant improvements in provider adherence to guidelines and
with significant improvements in patient disease control (Weingarten et al.
2002; Welch et al. 2011). Similarly, organizational interventions that facilitate
the structured and regular review of patients showed a positive effect on a vari-
ety of quality process measures (Renders et al. 2001; Gilbody et al. 2003).
Because the majority of the existing studies examining these issues were
conducted with large physician practice organizations (Casalino et al. 2003;
Li et al. 2004; Mehrotra et al. 2007; de Brantes and D’Andrea 2009), it is diffi-
cult to generalize the findings from those studies to all physicians and physi-
cian practices. Our study extends this line of inquiry by examining the
association of public reporting (PR) of physician quality and financial incen-
tives for quality performance in small- and medium-sized physician practices.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Assessing and providing feedback on the performance of physicians is widely
regarded as a key factor for improving the quality and efficiency of health care
delivery (Marshall et al. 2000; Campion et al. 2011; O’Brien et al. 2012).
Although such performance datamay be provided bymultiple sponsors and in
multiple forms, the underlying principle is similar—by making physicians
aware of their performance and encouraging or incentivizing improvement in
areas that are lacking, the quality of health care delivered will improve. At the
physician group level, thismeans that performance data on physicianswill play
a key role inmotivating the use of practices associatedwith high-quality care.
However, two related challenges are to determine how best to dissemi-
nate performance information and what, if any, incentives must be linked to
performance data so that physicians will be likely to use it (Gagliardi et al.
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2011; Hafner et al. 2011). Two principal forms of dissemination of physician
quality information currently dominate. First, physician quality information
may be collected, but disseminated only among the providers and staff within
a practice. Alternatively, physician quality data may be collected and pub-
lished in publicly available reports. Relative to private reporting of quality
data, PR of physician quality information assumes that as rational actors in a
market, physician practices will be motivated to improve quality because
patients will “vote with their feet” and take their business to practices that
report higher quality of care, and that the force of public opinion will act as a
catalyst for physician practices to improve their care (Hartig and Allison 2007;
Barr et al. 2008). However, these arguments may be mitigated by several
behavioral issues. Patients have been shown to both underutilize and misun-
derstand PR on physician quality, public opinion to date has not unified suffi-
ciently to galvanize physician behavior change, and switching behavior may
be constrained by provider availability or health plan restrictions (Pierce,
Bozic, and Bradford 2007; Parker et al. 2012). These concerns raise the
question of whether PR is marginally more effective in motivating CMP use
than quality performance reports provided only to practices and their
affiliated physicians.
The second challenge focuses on whether reporting of physician perfor-
mance alone—internally or publicly—is a necessary but insufficient condition
for physician practices to change their behavior. It may be the case that, to
realize the benefits of reporting physician quality information, positive perfor-
mance on such reports needs to be explicitly linked to greater financial
rewards. Combining PR and financial rewards may provide a greater incen-
tive to improve quality processes given that practices may obtain the “best of
both worlds” by receiving direct financial benefits for improving care quality
and the potential for increased market share and revenue if the public uses the
reports to select their providers.
Finally, differences among physician practices also imply that there is
likely to be a systematic selection of certain physician practice types into the
different quality reporting and financial arrangements. For instance, health
plan incentive arrangements are not typically applied uniformly to all physi-
cian practices in a network, and those practices that already have CMPs may
be more inclined to aggressively pursue incentive arrangements. Alterna-
tively, health plans may selectively impose the incentives to lower performing
practices that have not yet adopted CMPs to improve their performance. As
such, CMP adoption and incentive arrangements are potentially endogenous,
and the bias can either overstate or understate the effect of the incentives.
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Following from the discussion above, we test the following hypotheses:
Among those physician practices that are subject to either public or private
quality reporting, (1) those practices whose quality performance is publicly
reported show greater use of CMPs than those that receive only private report-
ing; (2) those practices inwhichfinancial incentives are tied to quality reporting
show greater use of CMPs than those that do not; (3) those practices that are
aware of and sensitive to public or private quality reports in their operational
routines show greater use of CMPs than those that are not; and (4) practices
that are subject to both PR and financial incentives for quality performance
show greater use ofCMPs relative to practices subject to only one or the other.
METHODS
Data
The primary data source for the study was The National Study of Small and
Medium-sized Physician Practices (NSSMPP). This population is of particular
interest in that most physicians in the United States do not practice in inte-
grated health systems or large medical groups. One third (35.1 percent) of
visits to office-based physicians in the United States are to solo practitioners,
and 88 percent are to practices with nine or fewer physicians. Widespread
CMP implementation in these practices may be particularly challenging rela-
tive to larger practices because they have less staff, more time pressures, and
fewer resources to support implementation (Rittenhouse et al. 2010, 2011).
The survey was designed to provide cross-sectional information about
small- and medium-sized physician practices (defined as those with fewer than
20 practicing physicians) providing care for the chronically ill and located
throughout the United States but focused on 14 communities designated as
the Aligning Forces for Quality (AF4Q) grantees (AF4Q communities are
listed in the Appendix). Specifically, we used the IMS Healthcare Organiza-
tion Services database to construct a sampling frame consisting of the follow-
ing practice types: primary care (family physicians, general internists, and
general practitioners); single specialty cardiology, endocrinology, or pulmon-
ology; or multispecialty practices with at least 60 percent physicians in these
specialties. We then created a stratified random sample, with stratification
based on practice size, (1–2, 3–8, 9–12, and 13–19 physicians), each of the spe-
cialty types, and location (AF4Q community or remainder of the United
States). Appropriate weighting enabled construction of a nationally represen-
tative sample of the population of interest.
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The NSSMPP survey was conducted via telephone by a professional
survey firm from July 2007 through March 2009. The firm interviewed the
lead physician or lead administrator of the practice; when this was not possi-
ble, the firm interviewed another knowledgeable physician in the practice.
The response rate was 67 percent. Given that more than two thirds of the
potential respondents have completed the survey, we believe nonresponse
bias, if any, is not likely to be a major concern.
Respondents from the 14 AF4Q communities totaled 1,201 practices.
However, because the primary aim of the studywas to examine the effect of PR
relative to nonpublic reporting onCMPuse, the final analytic sample included
only the 643 practices inAF4Q communities that were subject to either formof
quality reporting. In addition, a random sample of physician practices located
outside of theAF4Qcommunities (203 practices) was used to examinewhether
theAF4Qpractices systematically differ from non-AF4Qpractices.
Finally, the AF4Q evaluation team conducted primary data collection to
assess community-level PR activities in each of the 14 AF4Q communities
(Christianson et al. 2010); these included the number, years of operation, and
contents of available PR that provide comparative quality information on
physicians or physician practices during the period in which the physician sur-
vey was fielded. The collected information was current as of 2009. PR is not
the only source of physician quality information. To capture the prevalence of
physician quality information that are not truly public in nature—that is,
reports issued by health plans and made available only to their enrollees—we
estimated the percentage of the area population who were enrolled in health
plans that issue such reports to their members. This was estimated from the
InterStudy data on health plan enrollment and the Census estimate of popula-
tion size in each community. We used these data to construct the instrumental
variables (IVs) used for the treatment effects regression model analysis, as
described below.
Variables
The main outcome variable is an index reflecting the level of CMP use by a
physician practice. This measure is based on the Physician Organization Care
Management Index (POCMI) developed by Casalino et al. (2003). The
POCMI contains many of the same or similar indicators used by NCQA or
Patient-Centered Medical Home certification programs. POCMI is a sum-
mary measure that consists of the following five “domains:” case management
(i.e., reminders for preventative care, use of nurse care managers), physician
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feedback, disease registry, clinical practice guidelines, and self-management
skills (i.e., use of nonphysician staff educators). Under each domain, physician
practices get a “point” for using a CMP for patients with the following chronic
conditions: asthma, congestive heart failure, depression, and diabetes. For
example, if a physician practice used a disease registry only for its diabetes
patients, it would receive only one point. For this analysis, we count those
CMPs that are provided by larger physician organizations, such as Indepen-
dent Physician Associations (IPAs) and Physician Hospital Organizations
(PHOs), toward the practices’ POCMI measures, even if they are not directly
operated by the practices themselves. This is because our sample is limited to
small- and medium-sized physician practices that typically lack the resources
to implement all CMPs on their own. For these practices, it is likely that the
only feasible way of implementing some CMPs—for example, use of nurse
care managers for patients with chronic illnesses—for their patients is through
the support of larger external entities with which they are affiliated. The maxi-
mum possible POCMI value is 24: eight points under the “case management”
domain and four points for each of the other four domains.
The POCMI measure makes no assumptions about the relationship
among these processes, the order in which they are adopted and implemented,
or the relative importance (weight) of the process to quality of care. Because it
is designed to capture only the number of care management processes in use
in a practice, not a latent construct, there is no reason to expect that the constit-
uent items in the index will cohere in a manner that would result, for example,
in factors corresponding to the five designated domains of care management.
Currently, there is no existing literature suggesting that these assumptions are
not valid, and to our knowledge no alternative measure exists.
As our main explanatory variables, obtained from the NSSMPP survey,
include the following: (1) a binary indicator variable for whether the quality
performance of the practice is publicly reported; (2) a binary indicator vari-
able for whether the practice received additional revenue based on its quality
performance during the past year; and (3) a binary indicator variable to
capture whether the practice is aware of and/or sensitive to quality reports.
We consider a practice to be aware of and sensitive to quality reports if the
respondent reported that such reports are discussed at its physician meetings
or that its patients discuss PR on quality and/or patient satisfaction with its
physicians.
Because the survey relies on self-report and personal recollection of the
respondent to capture specific information about the past and current financial
arrangements, asking for exact numbers (e.g., percent of practice revenue
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from bonus income in the previous year) is likely to be subject to inaccuracies
and recall error. Use of binary variables, on the other hand, presumably
reduces such noise in the data.
To capture the level of community-level PR activity in each of the 14
AF4Q communities, we use the following variables obtained via the AF4Q
evaluation team’s primary data collection efforts: (1) whether the publicly
available physician quality reports contain comparative information on indi-
vidual physicians (as compared with the communities that have either no
PR or have reports that do not contain comparative information at individ-
ual-physician level); (2) length of PR (i.e., the number of years the reports
have been available in each AF4Q community) entered as a binary variable
that equals 1 if the community has been reporting for more than 4 years
and zero otherwise; and (3) the percent of population in the community
who are enrolled in private health plans that issue their own physician
quality reports. While not truly “public” in nature, these health plan–issued
physician quality reports presumably have the same function as the commu-
nity-level PR in incentivizing the physician practices within networks to
improve quality.
Other covariates include practice size, ownership type, percentage of
physicians who are primary care physicians, as well as the percentage of the
practice’s patients who are minority, payer mix, and an indicator variable for
whether the practice is a specialist-only practice (i.e., practices that are solely
comprised of cardiologists, endocrinologists, or pulmonologists).
Analysis
As discussed above, the most serious source of potential bias stems from the
possibility that those practices that are subject to PR and financial incentives
may be systematically different from those that are not. To reduce this endoge-
neity bias, we use treatment effects model (Maddala 1983) estimated via maxi-
mum likelihood estimation. The treatment effects model considers the effect
of an endogenous binary explanatory variable on the continuous dependent
variable, conditional on two sets of independent variables. The model is iden-
tified by IVs. The IVs are the community-level variables that capture the level
of PR activity in each community in which the practices operate. The rationale
is that the physician practice’s probability of being subject to PR and financial
incentives tied to quality performance are determined by these market-level
factors, but these factors do not affect the practices’s use of CMPs directly.
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The validity of these community-level PR variables as our IVs depends
on two assumptions. First physician practices do not directly influence the
market-level PR activities in each market. Second, there is no unobserved fac-
tor that affects both the market-level PR activities and PR of individual prac-
tice’s performance. The first assumption is reasonable in this context because
physician practices typically have no incentive to voluntarily reveal their qual-
ity metrics to the public; in most cases, they are simply subjected to PR
requirements as mandated either by public policy (e.g., California’s Depart-
ment of Managed Health Care’s requirement to report quality metrics) or by
payers. Moreover, small- to medium-sized physician practices typically lack
the resources and the initiative to coordinate across one another to collectively
influence the market-level PR activities in their communities.
The second assumption may potentially be violated if there is a strong
consumerdemand for thephysicianquality information incertain communities
that in turn influences both the market-level PR activities and the practices’ PR
of their quality metrics. Existing literature suggests that consumers are, gener-
ally speaking, interested in anddesire informationonquality of their health care
providers (Harris and Buntin 2008). At the same time, themost trusted sources
of provider of quality information for consumers are their own health care pro-
viders, friends, and relatives (Alexander et al. 2011). Thus, consumers aremore
likely to turn to their most trusted informal sources rather than to seek and
demand PR for such information. Therefore, it is unlikely that there is an unob-
servedconsumerdemand that is confounding the relationshipbetween themar-
ket-level PRactivities and individual practices’PRof their qualitymetrics.
In addition, we estimate a separate model to test whether there is a stron-
ger effect of using both PR and financial incentives jointly on practice’s use of
CMPs. The key independent variable for this model is a binary variable that
equals 1 if the practice is subject to both PR and financial incentives and zero if
it is subject to only one of the two. Those practices that are not subject to either
are removed from the sample (about 19.5 percent of the analytic sample).
Thus, in this subsample analysis, we hypothesize that those practices that are
subject to both PR and the financial incentives have higher POCMI scores
than those that are subject to only one or the other.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this analysis.
The average POCMI in our final sample is about 8.6 of the maximum value
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of 24. The availability of PR on physician quality was still limited at the time
of the survey, with 9 of the 14 communities having no report while only 2 of
the communities had such reports for more than 4 years. The exposure to
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics




Practice incentives tied to quality reports % Yes Yes* No*
Practice quality is publicly reported 49.10% 9.7, 9 (4–14) 7.5, 6 (3–11)
Receives income from performance 65.10% 9.0, 8 (4–14) 7.5, 6 (3–11)
Aware of/sensitive to quality reports 18.20% 12.2, 12 (8–17) 7.7, 7 (3–12)
Joint effect of PR and income incentives
Subject to neither PR nor income 19.50%
Subject to PR incentive only 15.40%
Subject to income incentive only 31.00%
Subject to both PR and income 34.10%
Physician practice characteristics
No. of physicians in the practice 3.6 (3.45)
Specialist-only practice 8.60%
Practice ownership (omitted: owned by physicians)
Owned by larger medical group 5.00%
Owned by hospital 14.60%
Owned by nonphysician managers 0.30%
Owned by other entities 3.30%
Patient characteristics
% Patients with limited English 6.17 (11.53)
% Patients who are black 13.27 (18.15)
% Patients who are Hispanic 5.88 (8.30)
Revenue source (omitted: % revenue from commercial)
% Revenue:Medicare 31.3 (16.81)
% Revenue:Medicaid 10.54 (12.89)
% Revenue: Other insurance 4.07 (5.41)
% Revenue: Self-pay low Inc. 3.99 (4.83)
% Revenue: Self-pay high Inc. 2.52 (3.7)
% Revenue: Other 1.17 (7.18)
Community-Level Variables (N = 14)
Community-level PR activity
% Pop in private HPwith quality reports 28.12 (21.33)
Length of physician PR >4 years 14.3% (2 of 14)
PR content (omitted: no physician PR available)
PR contain info at individual-physician level 21.4% (3 of 14)
PR do not contain at individual-physician level 14.3% (2 of 14)
Note. Mean and standard deviation shown in parentheses for continuous variables. PR, public
reporting.
*Mean, median, and interquartile range (in parentheses) of corresponding POCMIvalues.
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health plan–issued physician quality reports remained at, on average, 28
percent of each community population. Table 1 also shows that, consistent
with the prior expectation, those practices subject to financial and/or PR and
are aware/sensitive to quality reporting have higher POCMI scores.
As described above, we compared our final sample (i.e., practices
located in the AF4Q communities) to the national comparison sample consist-
ing of non-AF4Q practices and found that the AF4Q practices were less likely
to be specialist-only practices (9 percent vs 41 percent); had fewer Hispanic
patients (6 percent vs 13 percent); and were more likely to receive income
based on performance (65 percent vs 40 percent). However, there was only a
negligible difference in terms of POCMI measures (8.6 vs 7.6). See Appendix
for the full comparison between the national comparison sample and the
AF4Q communities.
Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the treatment effects model estima-
tions. Table 2 suggests that controlling for a variety of practice and patient
cohort characteristics, those practices that receive additional income from
quality performance have POCMI scores that are, on average, about 7 points
higher than those that do not receive such additional income (column 2).
It also suggests that, on average, those practices that are aware of and/or sensi-
tive to quality reports have POCMI scores that are about 17 points higher than
those that are not (column 3). On the other hand, PR appears to have no signif-
icant, marginal effect on practices’ use of CMPs (column 1). It is important to
note, however, that the point estimate for PR suggests a relatively large effect
size (about 8 points higher compared with practices whose quality data are not
publicly reported).
Table 3 indicates that practices whose communities make available PR
of physician quality reports at the individual-physician level are more likely
to be subject to financial incentives tied to quality performance (column 1),
more likely to receive additional income from performance (column 2), and
more likely to be sensitive and aware of quality reports (column 3). Table 3
also indicates that longer histories of physician quality PR at the community
level is consistently associated with lower likelihood of practices being sub-
ject to incentives tied to quality reporting. One possible explanation is that
the reports that have been in existence for a longer period might be less rele-
vant and less meaningful than the more recently issued reports.
Table 4 suggests that the POCMI scores of those practices that are sub-
ject to both PR and the financial incentives tied to quality performance are, on
average, about 10 points higher than those practices that are subject to only
one or the other. In other words, there is a significant joint effect of having
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both PR and financial incentives above and beyond having just one of
them. As stated earlier, the presence of community-level PR, that contain
individual-physician level information significantly influences the likelihood
of a practice being subject to both of the incentives.
To test how our estimates may change under alternative models, we esti-
mated three additional models: ordinary least square (OLS), two-stage least
square, and treatment effects with no instruments. In general, the estimated
incentive effects increase as the model moves from the “naïve” (i.e., OLS) to
the more complicated, suggesting that our treatment effects model reduces the
Table 2: Treatment-Effect Regression Results: Second Stage (SE in
parentheses)
POCMI (1) (2) (3)
Practice incentives tied to quality
reports










No. of physicians in the practice 0.021 (0.103) 0.023 (0.108) 0.052 (0.103)
Specialist-only practice 3.393 (1.539)** 1.57 (1.227) 2.043 (1.412)
Practice ownership†
Owned by larger medical group 0.057 (1.373) 0.06 (1.484) 0.267 (1.403)
Owned by hospital 1.075 (1.806) 0.033 (0.745) 0.994 (0.822)
Owned by nonphysician
managers
6.105 (1.356)*** 5.025 (1.127)*** 9.565 (2.143)***
Owned by other entities 0.605 (2.9) 0.494 (1.372) 1.384 (1.667)
Patient characteristics
% Patients with limited English 0.011 (0.057) 0.036 (0.033) 0.055 (0.021)***
% Patients who are black 0.031 (0.01)*** 0.028 (0.015)* 0.028 (0.014)**
% Patients who are Hispanic 0.062 (0.055) 0.074 (0.047) 0.035 (0.03)
Revenue source‡
%Revenue:Medicare 0.032 (0.031) 0.025 (0.018)
% Revenue:Medicaid 0.037 (0.029) 0.035 (0.021)* 0.001 (0.027)
% Revenue: Other insurance 0.152 (0.069)** 0.136 (0.05)*** 0.12 (0.053)**
%Revenue: Self-pay low Inc. 0.024 (0.11) 0.127 (0.036)*** 0.069 (0.052)
% Revenue: Self-pay high Inc. 0.066 (0.109) 0.033 (0.055) 0.145 (0.078)*
% Revenue: Other 0.032 (0.033) 0.013 (0.047) 0.007 (0.041)
Constant 2.545 (6.642) 2.486 (1.244)** 4.445 (0.942)***
†Omitted: Owned by physicians in practice.
‡Omitted: % Revenue from commercial payers.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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endogeneity bias that is causing a downward bias on our estimates. The
selected results are shown in the Appendix.
DISCUSSION
Several findings from our study merit particular discussion. First, the incre-
mental effect of PR among practices that are engaged in some form of quality
reporting is not statistically significant, even though the estimated impact is
Table 3: Treatment-EffectRegressionResults: First Stage (SE in parentheses)
Practice Incentives Tied to
Quality Reports (1) (2) (3)
Public reporting (PR) content†
PR contains quality info at
individual-physician level
0.579 (0.15)*** 0.605 (0.247)** 0.639 (0.091)***
PR does not contain quality info
at individual-physician level
0.018 (0.141) 0.057 (0.274) 0.066 (0.074)
Community-level PR activity
% Pop in private HPwith
quality reports
0.006 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009) 0.001 (0.002)
Length of physician PR >4 years 0.426 (0.201)** 0.284 (0.224) 0.631 (0.129)***
Physician characteristics
No. of physicians in the practice 0.011 (0.017) 0.03 (0.012)** 0.017 (0.018)
Specialist-only practice 0.046 (0.333) 0.784 (0.191)*** 0.397 (0.23)*
Practice ownership‡
Owned by larger medical group 0.079 (0.278) 0.169 (0.268) 0.021 (0.307)
Owned by hospital 0.247 (0.105)** 0.124 (0.177) 0.156 (0.115)
Owned by nonphysician managers 0.091 (0.778) 0.315 (0.689) 0.624 (0.455)
Owned by other entities 0.348 (0.301) 0.205 (0.267) 0.273 (0.338)
Patient characteristics
% Patients with limited English 0.016 (0.009)* 0.004 (0.006) 0.014 (0.003)***
% Patients who are black 0.002 (0.002) 0.003 (0.006) 0.003 (0.003)
% Patients who are Hispanic 0.007 (0.007) 0.01 (0.008) 0.008 (0.004)*
Revenue source§
%Revenue:Medicare 0.005 (0.003) 0.004 (0.005) 0.002 (0.003)
% Revenue:Medicaid 0.003 (0.005) 0 (0.006) 0 (0.004)
% Revenue: Other insurance 0.006 (0.009) 0.006 (0.008) 0.007 (0.006)
% Revenue: Self-pay low Inc. 0.022 (0.006)*** 0.018 (0.015) 0.04 (0.012)***
%Revenue: Self-pay high Inc. 0.017 (0.014) 0.018 (0.022) 0.042 (0.017)**
%Revenue: Other 0.004 (0.009) 0.004 (0.009) 0.009 (0.006)
Constant 0.15 (0.357) 0.134 (0.396) 1.019 (0.201)***
†Omitted: No physician PR available.
‡Omitted: Owned by physicians in practice.
§Omitted: % Revenue from commercial payers.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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large, due to the large standard error around the estimate. This indicates
wide variation among physician practices in terms of CMP use in response
to PR—some practices respond very sensitively and positively to PR, while
others do not. However, only when PR is coupled with financial incentives
tied to improved quality performance is there a significant and consistent
association between PR and use of CMPs. These findings suggest that as a
market-wide strategy, PR alone may not yet be sufficiently robust to elicit
Table 4: Treatment-Effects Regression Results: Joint Effect of Public Report-




Both PR and Income
Incentives
Practice incentives tied to quality reports
Both PR and financial incentive 10.12 (2.456)***
Community-level PR activity
% Pop in private HPwith quality reports 0.003 (0.004)
Length of physician PR >4 years 0.579 (0.088)***
PR contents (omitted: no physician PR available)
PR contain quality info at individual-physician level 0.67 (0.173)***
PR do not contain at individual-physician level 0.034 (0.173)
Physician characteristics
No. of physicians in the practice 0.062 (0.118) 0.005 (0.019)
Specialist-only practice 2.482 (2.376) 0.195 (0.276)
Practice ownership†
Owned by larger medical group 0.556 (1.463) 0.272 (0.261)
Owned by hospital 1.192 (0.959) 0.022 (0.194)
Owned by nonphysician managers 9.231 (2.372)*** 4.467 (0.86)***
Owned by other entities 2.747 (2.31) 0.527 (0.357)
Patient characteristics
% Patients with limited English 0.018 (0.045) 0.004 (0.007)
% Patients who are black 0.021 (0.012)* 0.004 (0.003)
% Patients who are Hispanic 0.055 (0.056) 0.012 (0.01)
Revenue source‡
%Revenue:Medicare 0.007 (0.023) 0.001 (0.005)
% Revenue:Medicaid 0.043 (0.031) 0.002 (0.005)
% Revenue: Other insurance 0.164 (0.067)** 0.005 (0.01)
% Revenue: Self-pay low Inc. 0.041 (0.068) 0.013 (0.011)
% Revenue: Self-pay high Inc. 0.002 (0.057) 0.011 (0.012)
% Revenue: Other 0.034 (0.042) 0.008 (0.01)
Constant 3.334 (1.382)** 0.332 (0.386)
Note. Sample is restricted to those practices that either publicly report physician quality, receive
additional income from quality performance, or both (N = 489).
†Omitted: Owned by physicians in practice.
‡Omitted: % Revenue from commercial payers.
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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consistent changes in physician behaviors across all practices. One explana-
tion might be that such reporting has not had sufficient time to take effect.
Compared with hospital quality reporting, reports on physician quality are
much less common and are typically more limited in the quality measures
reported (McNamara 2006). Other research indicates that there is relatively
limited awareness of PR and that considerable work remains in engaging
consumers; increasing the number and enhancing the content of PR alone
may not be enough to facilitate better-informed decision making on the part
of health care consumers (Schneider and Epstein 1998; Marshall et al. 2000;
Werner and Asch 2005).
Our results also indicate that, regardless of whether the quality informa-
tion is publicly reported, those small- to medium-sized practices that receive
additional income based on performance are more likely to use CMPs. This
may indicate either that physician practices that participate in quality report-
ing require financial rewards for investing the additional time and effort to
change clinical practices, or that practices that have care management pro-
cesses in place are more likely to produce quality outcomes/measures consis-
tent with pay for performance standards or other incentive programs. These
results also give credence to the argument that changes in physician practice
behavior require a concomitant change in financial incentives, especially
given the inertia that must be overcome in transitioning from long-standing
behaviors and the many other pressures that primary care physicians face. It is
encouraging, therefore, that the group-level incentives measured in the cur-
rent study seem to be linked to use of CMPs. It is also interesting to note that
the size of financial incentives was, on average, quite small in our sample of
physician practices, suggesting that even a small increase in financial incen-
tives for practices may result in greater use of CMPs.
Perhaps the most interesting result in our study was the positive associa-
tion between our measure of awareness/sensitivity to quality reports and the
use of CMPs. This findingmay indicate that physician practices need to “inter-
nalize” or use quality reporting results in their decision making for it to have
an impact on practice behavior and quality improvement. Put another way,
reporting data will not in and of itself produce the intended effects of improv-
ing quality and motivating physicians to take action to correct quality prob-
lems. Results of such reporting must actually be seen as a strategic and/or
decision-making tool for it to have such effects. These results also indicate that
a better understanding of what goes on inside the “black box” of physician
practices in terms of change, decision making, and information processing
may be as important to improving quality as the external policy approaches,
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such as PR of physician quality information or pay for performance. The fact
that our results suggest that quality reporting is not being internalized by all
physician groups also highlights the potential tension between various organi-
zational goals in physician groups. To the extent that quality reporting and
financial incentives matter to physician groups, and the use of such incentives
is specifically targeted at increasing physician use of quality improvement
techniques and quality outcomes, questions must be raised about the effects of
such approaches on other priorities, such as improving value to the consumer,
increasing revenue, or increasing organizational adaptability. Clearly, policy
makers and physician group leaders must be cognizant of such multiple goals
and competing priorities of physicians to avoid unanticipated and undesirable
outcomes.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that our sample consisted of
small-to medium-sized practices, and that these practices have frequently been
seen as lacking the resources, time, or experience to fully use and sustain the
types of CMPs that are the focus of this study (Holmboe et al. 2005; Wolfson
et al. 2009). This is borne out in the fact that the average POCMI score for
sample practices was only 8.6 of a possible 24 compared with a mean score of
11.1 for a sample of large practices examined in a previous study (Rittenhouse
et al. 2010). Thus, we might speculate that the link between PR and practice
behavior may be more tenuous for small- to medium-sized practices and that
additional hands-on support and resources for quality improvement may be
required for these organizations, relative to their larger counterparts. Addi-
tional research is required that examines the change process in these practices,
including identification of challenges and strategies for overcoming barriers to
change.
Several limitations of our study may temper the interpretations made
above. First, and perhaps most important, the cross-sectional study design
does not allow causal inferences about the relationships between PR, financial
incentives, and CMP. Although our theory suggests that PR and financial
incentives influence the use of CMPs, technically the reverse may be true.
While our empirical method attempts to get around this reverse-causality bias,
its validity critically depends on how well the assumptions of the two-stage, IV
model were met. Because the treatment effects model is nonlinear, the identifi-
cation of the model depends on the functional form as well as the IVs chosen.
While we believe that the IVs used in our model are theoretically justified and
reasonable, there is no clear way of testing the validity of these assumptions.
Finally, inclusion of market fixed effects in our model is not feasible because
Use of Care Management Practices in Small- and Medium-Sized Physician Groups 391
the market-level variables would be perfectly collinear with the market
dummy variables.
Second, our analysis considers only general measures of both PR and
financial incentives. Data limitations precluded analysis of the specific provi-
sions of PR, the quality of data used in these reports, or whether individual-
physician financial incentives were used in conjunction with group-level
incentives for quality. Future investigations should clearly examine in more
granular fashion the extent to which differences in quality improvement vary
as a function of the nature and scope of PR or financial incentives. However,
given that variation in CMPs exists, and that our results were obtained using
more general measures of financial incentives, PR, and physician practices’
use of quality reports, our tests might be considered conservative. Finally, we
focused primarily on the role of information/quality reporting and financial
incentives as motivation for quality improvement. While such factors may be
important determinants of quality improvement, we make no claim that these
are the only factors related to quality improvement. Especially important to
consider are nonfinancial motivators such as professional pride, peer competi-
tion, self-image, and organizational identification (Dukerich, Golden, and
Shortell 2002).
Finally, even though we utilize observations from a nationally repre-
sentative sample of small–medium size practices that provide care to chroni-
cally ill patients, our analytic sample itself was not randomly drawn from this
larger sample. Our results, therefore, may not be applicable to the original
population.
CONCLUSION
As CMS and other national payers move forward on the PR path, the value of
developing or maintaining community-based PR of physician performance is
likely to be questioned. In particular, health plans may find fewer reasons to
continue their financial support for these local efforts, and some physicians
may view the submission of data for development of local PR as an unneces-
sary expense if they see these reports as duplicative of CMS reporting efforts.
The case for community-level reports then could rest, to a much greater extent
than it does now, on the ability of the sponsoring organizations to innovate in
performance measurement and report dissemination, and to engage local
stakeholders, both consumers and physicians, in using physician quality data
to inform decisions and motivate quality improvement. Future research
392 HSR: Health Services Research 48:2, Part I (April 2013)
clearly needs to focus on investigating the appropriate mix and type of incen-
tive arrangements and quality reporting in physician groups.
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